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state Enforcement of Alaska Native Tribal Law: The Congressional 
Mandate of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 
* ** 
Stephen Conn and Bart K. Garber 
Subsistence is the production, consumption, distribution and 
exchange of natural resources which are necessary for the 
physical, social and cultural maintenance of a society. The 
goods and services are produced and exchanged in a patterned 
fashion within a societr according to established customary 
laws, norms and values. 
I. Introduction 
Law journals, newspapers, and the courts all document Native 
unrest and dissatisfaction with state management of their 
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NEWS, March 1983, at 3-4. 
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subsistence lifestyles.2 The state Boards of Fish and Game stand 
accused of being either insensitive to the needs of rural 
subsistence users or unappreciative of the legal directive to 
provide real priority for subsistence uses on public lands in 
Alaska. Tribally enforced hunting codes are held up as a threat 
to state game management in hopes of getting Alaska to pay 
attention to village subsistence needs.3 "Co-management" by 
Native controlled resource management commissions is also raised 
as an alternative or supplement to the state model. 4 Each 
suggestion poses admitted drawbacks5 , not the least of which is 
the fact that state control over subsistence uses on public lands 
in Alaska is unlikely ever to be forfeited voluntarily. The 
challenge lies in explaining how the state's misguided approach 
2 This paper will not deal with the issue of federal 
management of subsistence uses in national parks, monuments and 
preserves nor with federal land use review responsibilities where 
federal actions might restrict subsistence uses on public lands. 
However, the minimal federal standard applied to state 
subsistence management will likewise apply to federal subsistence 
management programs. 
3 Noble, Tribal Powers to Regulate Hunting In Alaska, 4 
ALASKA L. REV. 223 (1987). 
4 Case, Subsistence and Self-Determination: Can Alaska 
Natives Have a More "Effective Voice"?, 60 U.COLO.L.REV. 1009 
(1989). 
5 Tribal jurisdiction may not cover all lands necessary 
to support Native subsistence activities and may be prohibitive 
in terms of the effort and money required to implement codes on a 
village by village basis. Co-management as exemplified by the 
Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission relies upon the effective 
exclusion of state authority by the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 
16 u.s.c. §§ 1361-1407 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), and subsidization 
by the North Slope Borough--conditions unlikely to be duplicated 
in other parts of rural Alaska. 
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to subsistence management policies and laws can be put back on 
track in a way "that reflects the realities of the society whose 
conduct they are to govern ... 11 6 
It is the thesis of this paper that the Alaska National 
Interest Lands Conservation Act ("ANILCA")7 requires the state to 
discover and incorporate community-derived tribal law (customs 
and traditions as regarding the taking and gathering of wild, 
renewable resources) as the applicable minimum federal standard 
to the extent that conservation of the resource permits.8 Recent 
federal court decisions jarring the state's established view of 
what are proper subsistence policies and regulatory regimes cry 
for a context in which to construct a more appropriate approach 
6 D. GETCHES, TROUBLE AHEAD: SOME QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
ABOUT THE FUTURE OF SUBSISTENCE HUNTING AND FISHING FOR ALASKA 
VILLAGES, 20 (1975). If the laws do not do so, "there will be a 
disrespect for the law in general. " Id. 
7 16 u.s.c. §§ 3101-3233 (1982 and Supp. V 1987). 
8 Karen J. Atkinson, a past law clerk for the Native 
American Rights Fund, nearly came to the same conclusion in her 
law student note, The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation 
Act: Striking the Balance in Favor of "Customary and 
Traditional" Subsistence Uses By Alaska Natives, 27 NATURAL 
RESOURCES JOURNAL 421 (1987): "The Conservation Act reflects 
Congress' desire to protect Native culture and the lifestyle 
embodied in subsistence activities and not simply the mere act of 
'subsisting .. . ' (citations omitted. ] The criteria encompasses 
beliefs and customs handed down from generation to generation. " 
Id. at 439. Atkinson noted the connections between cultural 
beliefs/customs and subsistence uses but did go on to describe 
the federal standard as a legal system adopted by reference. 
This conclusion and its policy and implementation consequences 
crystalize the legal struggle going on between the state and 
Alaska Native subsistence users over what each believes to be 
required by ANILCA and necessary to preserve the Native way of 
life. 
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to state subsistence management. That context is found by 
viewing ANILCA as Congress cast it -- as Indian legislation 
protecting the lifestyles and values of Alaska Native peoples, as 
the Natives themselves wish them to be preserved, as such 
legislation has so many times before for Indian tribes throughout 
the United States. 
II. Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights 
Throughout the history of contact between European immigrant 
societies and Native Americans including Alaska Natives, Indian 
hunting, fishing and gathering have represented core, cultural 
customs and practices upon which Indian communities have relied 
for sustenance, to maintain their traditions and lifestyles, and 
to establish legal claims to land.9 Indian hunting and fishing 
are a form of aboriginal rights which have been uniformly 
preserved as a group interest held by Indian tribes unless 
granted by the tribe to the United States by treaty, abandoned, 
9 See generally, F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
441, 442-470, (1982 ed.); The Russians first protected Alaska 
Native rights to hunt and fish in the Second (1821) and Third 
{1844) Charters of the Russian American Company: "The natives 
not employed by the Company are permitted to enjoy fishing along 
the shores where they live, while free from the service of the 
Company, in order to procure food for themselves and their 
families. They shall not, however, visit the neighboring shores 
without permission of the colonial authorities. They are 
entitled also to catch the sea animals and the wild beasts on 
these islands and places where they are living, and everything 
acquired by them in this way is their full property. If, 
however, they would like to trade some of their furs, they are 
permitted to sell them only to the Company at fixed rates which 
shall be submitted by the Board of Directors to the Government. 
Russian Administration of Alaska and the Status of the Alaska 
Natives, s. Doc. No. 152, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 45, 50-51 (6 April 
1950). 
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or extinguished by statute.10 
Typically, when settler population pressures for land built 
up to an intolerable degree, the federal government stepped in, 
negotiated with a local Indian tribe and executed a treaty 
whereby the tribe relinquished its claims to large areas of land 
and in exchange gained recognition of aboriginal rights in a 
smaller parcel, including exclusive hunting, fishing and 
gathering rights. 11 Often, within tribal territory, hunting and 
fishing rights off-reservation, tribal jurisdiction is the rule, 
subject only to the authority of Congress.12 Federal statutes 
and ratified treaties normally preempt otherwise applicable state 
laws regarding Indian hunting and fishing.13 Federal oversight 
and enforcement of Indian hunting and fishing rights generally 
10 See Sac & Fox Tribe v. Licklider, 576 F.2d 145 (8th 
cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); See�, Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act, 43 u.s.c. 1601, 1605 (1982 & Supp V 1987). 
11 COHEN, supra note 9 at 444, n. 16 citing Washington v. 
Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U. S. 658 (1979); Menominee Tribe v. 
United States, 391 U. S. 404 (1968); Puyallup Tribe v. Department 
of Game, 391 U. S. 392 (1968); United States v. Winans, 198 U. S. 
371 (1905). Cohen points out that the Puyallup controversy has 
been to the United States Supreme Court three times with the 
cases referred to as Puyallup I (Puyallup Tribe v. Department of 
Game, 391 U. S. 392 (1968)), Puyallup II (Department of Game v. 
Puyallup Tribe, 414 U. S. 44 (1973)), and Puyallup III (Puyallup 
Tribe v. Department of Game, 433 U. S. 165 (1977)). 
12 See, COHEN, supra note 9 at ch. 4, sec. A. and ch. 8, 
sec. Dl, n. 2 citing Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. 
Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Minn. 1971); State v. McClure, 127 
Mont. 534, 268 P. 2d 629 (1954) . .. Washington v. Fishing Vessel 
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979); Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th 
Cir. 1974) (off-reservation tribal regulation) . 
13 �' Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975). 
6 
are limited to judicial clarification of the scope of the right14 
and federal regulation where international treaty obligations 
require implementation15 but only rarely extend to controlling 
domestic Indian hunting and fishing rights.16 
Off-reservation Indian hunting and fishing treaty rights 
usually only reserve a right in common with non-Indians.17 Off 
reservation treaty provisions have been interpreted by the courts 
to generally reserve tribal jurisdiction with state authority 
available only when "reasonable and necessary for the 
conservation of the (resource). 11 18 Both on and off reservation 
Indian treaty hunting and fishing rights are considered property 
interests which can only be diminished voluntarily by the tribe 
or by congressional action. 19 
14 � , ""U....,n""'i"""t:..:::e:..:::d,..__,S:....:t�a"-t,:C:e,::.se:<._v..:......:... ---'-'Wc:::a:..::sc.:.h:..:i._.n-'-'g:,..;t:::co=n , 3 8 4 F . Su pp • 3 4 O 
(W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976); Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 
443 U. S. 658 (1979). 
15 See generally, D. CASE, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN 
LAWS 279-286 {1984). 
16 
(1962). 
17 
�' Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45 
�, United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). 
18 Puyallup II, 414 U.S. 44 (1973); Tulee v. Washington, 
315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942); Cf., Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 
369 U.S. 60 (1962), where the Supreme Court determined that no 
federal law specifically limited state power to regulate off­
reservation Indian fishing. 
19 Consequently, Indian hunting and fishing rights 
recognized by treaty or statute must be paid for when taken 
otherwise diminished. Menominee v. United States, 391 U.S. 
(1968). 
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III. Alaska Native Hunting and Fishing Rights 
Alaska Natives historically exercised their subsistence 
rights under conditions only slightly different from their 
southern cousins. The contemporary history of their hunting and 
fishing breaks down into three time periods: before the Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act20 (pre-ANCSA), between the passage 
of ANCSA and ANILCA (ANCSA), and after the passage of ANILCA 
(ANILCA). 
A. Pre-ANCSA 
For over a hundred years, the United States preserved the 
hunting and fishing rights of Alaska Natives. 21 For a time the 
federal government even recognized the need to guarantee Alaska 
Natives exclusive rights by reserving federal land for the 
20 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
21 The United States guaranteed Alaska Native hunting and 
fishing rights as had the Russians before. United States v. 
Berrigan, 2 Alaska Rep. 442, 446 (D. Alaska, 1905). Though 
Article III of the 1867 Treaty of Cession, 15 Stat. 539, left 
Congress the freedom to treat with Alaska Natives on land and 
land related matters in the same way it dealt with other Indian 
tribes, Alaska Native subsistence rights were protected 
unilaterally by statute rather than by negotiated treaty due to 
the prohibition against such treaties with Indian tribes imposed 
by Congress in 1871: Act of 1 July 1870, ch. 189, 16 Stat. 180 
(Native exemption from fur sealing prohibition); Act of 7 June 
1902, 32 Stat. 327 (Native exemption to kill game animals and 
birds for food and clothing) reenacted by the Act of 11 March 
1908, 35 Stat. 102; Migratory Bird Treaty of 1916, 39 Stat. 1702, 
1703 (Native exemption); Act of 6 June 1924, 43 Stat. 464 (Native 
exemption from fisheries closures); Act of 13 January 1925, 43 
Stat. 739 (Restricted the Alaska Game Commission' s authority to 
limit Native hunting for food) extended by the Act of 25 June 
1938, 52 stat. 1169, 1171; Act of 18 August 1941, 55 Stat. 632 
(Native exemption for taking of Walrus). See also, CASE, supra 
note 15 at 279-294 regarding federal subsistence law preemption 
in Alaska. 
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benefit of Natives.22 Finally, federal ownership of nearly all 
the land in Alaska, together with the lack of any significant 
settler population pressures, provided Native communities with 
the functional, if not legal, equivalent of both on and off­
reservation recognized hunting and fishing rights in all but the 
most developed areas of Alaska.23 
As in other frontier times, however, development interests 
and politics put an end to any hope of preserving Native 
subsistence through reservation of federal lands. 24 It was left 
to growing numbers of Native communities and organizations to 
begin the rally for settlement of their aboriginal claims to land 
22 See, Alaska Native Land Claims: Hearings on S. 35 and 
S. 835 Before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92nd 
Cong. , 1st Sess. 362, 365 (1971) (reprinted statement of 
Assistant Secretary William E. Warne, February 24, 1948). 
23 Id. at 364-365; also see generally, C. Naske, 
Aboriginal Land Claims - A Thorny Issue ( ,198_) (copy of 
unpublished manuscript on file with authors). Professor Naske's 
commentary based on original archival materials from the 1930s to 
1940s reservation period in Alaska reports a rapid rate of land 
loss by Natives in the Southeastern part of Alaska. Id. at 26-27. 
24 Id. at 39-40: "Silverman (Irwin W. Silverman, chief 
counsel of the Division of Territories and Island Possessions, 
December, 1947] based his recommendation (to stop creating Indian 
reservations] on the fact that there was much opposition to the 
establishment of reservations both within and outside the 
department because the withdrawal of so much 'valuable land will 
effectively deter the settlement of Alaska and the development of 
the resources. ''' Of course, Natives were already settled in 
Alaska. The Alaskan Chambers of Commerce were more forthright: 
''These bodies argued 'that white men are more capable of 
developing Alaskan resources than are the Natives. "' Id. Though 
both Delegate Bartlett and Governor Gruening liked to remind 
department officials that Alaska Natives objected to reservations 
because they were allegedly discriminatory, Id. at 37, many 
Natives objected to them because they did not include enough land 
to encompass Native subsistence activities. Id. at 22. 
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and resources following statehood and into the 1960s. 25 
B. ANCSA 
In 1971 the Congress extinguished all hunting and fishing 
rights that Alaska Natives might possess with the passage of the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. 26 
Throughout the political struggle leading to the passage of 
ANCSA, Alaska Natives put special emphasis on aboriginal hunting, 
fishing and gathering rights. First and foremost, Natives and 
federal policymakers knew some form of subsistence right or 
privilege would be necessary for Natives to sustain their 
traditional lifestyles. 27 Secondly, subsistence established the 
prerequisite use and occupancy to prove claims to aboriginal 
title which all concerned wished to settle.28 Some Native 
25 
ed.) 
See, R. ARNOLD, ALASKA NATIVE LAND CLAIMS 93-144 (1978 
26 43 U.S.C. § 1603(b) provides: "All aboriginal titles, 
if any, and claims of aboriginal title in Alaska based on use and 
occupancy, including submerged land underneath all water area, 
both inland and offshore, and including any aboriginal hunting 
and fishing rights that may exist, are hereby extinguished." 
Alaska Native tribes may yet hold aboriginal title to submerged 
lands and resources beyond the three mile territorial limit. 
Gambell v. Lujan, __ F. 2d __ (9th Cir. 1989), petition for 
rehearing pending, on remand, Nos. 83-3735, 83-3781 
(D.Alaska) (Von der Heydt). 
27 See, FEDERAL FIELD COMMITTEE, ALASKA NATIVES AND THE 
LAND 540 (1968), The committee outlined options for subsistence 
use lands including transfers of fee title to at least 60 million 
acres as well as rights of access to federal and state public 
lands through easements or grants of exclusive use rights. 
28 �, Alaska Native Land Claims: Hearings on S. 2906 and 
s. 1964, S. 2690, ands. 2020 Before the Committee on Interior adn 
Insular Affairs, 90th Cong. , 2nd. Sess. 44-49 (1968) (Statement of 
Peter John, Spokesman From the Village of Minto). 
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leaders thought subsistence rights were also necessary to carry 
Natives over to the time when their communities could survive in 
a market based economy.29 Maintenance of Alaska Native 
subsistence rights thus became the focus of Natives who wished to 
sustain traditional culture as well as those who expected a 
gradual change in Native values and lifestyles. 
The continued viability of traditional Native subsistence 
lifestyles based on subsistence customs and practices was a key 
component in nearly every piece of legislation proposed to 
resolve Alaska Native aboriginal claims.30 The bills reflected 
two means of ensuring Native subsistence rights -- Natives would 
retain sufficient land bases to sustain subsistence activities 
and Natives as a group would be reserved a right to continue 
subsistence uses on federal and state lands on a permit basis. 
Most bills incorporated a combination of the two options, since 
early federal studies determined that Native groups actually used 
over 60 million acres for subsistence purposes.31 
Protection of Native subsistence use quickly took the 
backseat to Native land entitlement brokering once legislative 
29 Id. at 31 (Statement of Emil Notti, President, Alaska 
Federation of Natives). 
30 Many evolved directly from the Federal Field 
Committee's report, supra note 27. �, s. REP. NO. 925, 
Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1970), report on S. 1830 -- H.R. 10139 
identical. Others adopted similar permit rights on public 
s. REP. NO. 405, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1971), report on 
Also see, s. 835 and H.R. 3100. 
31 Federal Field Committee, supra note 27 at 540. 
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91st. 
is 
lands, 
s. 35. 
options began winding down to a few choices. 32 The Conference 
Committee ultimately extinguished Native aboriginal hunting and 
fishing rights subject only to the expectation that the Secretary 
of Interior and the state would provide for such uses. 33 Forty 
million acres of Native surface estate, disinterested federal 
officials and a recalcitrant state bureaucracy were capable 
neither of protecting Native subsistence rights and practices nor 
of impeding the reality of their dogged existence. 34 
C. ANILCA 
32 �' Hearings, supra note 22 at 290, 298-299 {Statement 
of Hon. W. A. Egan, Governor of the State of Alaska), Egan concedes 
the need to set aside "substantial acreage for subsistence 
protection, 11 but is more interested in land entitlement and 
selection priorities needed to be worked out between the State and 
the Natives. 
33 See, 43 U. S. C. § 1616 (d) (1982 & Supp. V 1985); The 
Conference Committee which combined the final House and Senate 
versions of a Native land claims settlement bill in 1971 
reported: "The Conference Committee after careful consideration 
believes that all Native interests in subsistence resource land 
can and will be protected by the Secretary through the exercise 
of his existing withdrawal authority. The Secretary could, for 
example, withdraw appropriate lands and classify them in a manner 
which would protect Native subsistence needs and requirements by 
closing appropriate lands to entry by nonresidents when 
subsistence resources for these lands are in short supply or 
otherwise threatened. The Conference Committee expects both the 
Secretary and the State to take any action necessary to protect 
the subsistence needs of the Native. " S. REP. NO. 581, 92d Cong. , 
1st Sess. 37 (1971). 
34 CASE, supra note 15 at 294-298; Also see, GETCHES, 
supra note 6 at 12-14. Barely a year after he voted to terminate 
Native hunting and fishing rights in ANCSA, Senator Stevens 
acknowledged in comments regarding the Marine Mammal Protection 
Native exemption: 11 • • •  But, nonetheless, (Natives}, too, have the 
right to be left alone, to follow their traditional way of life. 
It is this way of life I seek to protect in this bill. " Remarks 
of Senator Ted Stevens, 118 Cong. Rec. 25, 258 (1972). 
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Congress returned to the task of preserving the core element 
of traditional Native lifestyles nearly ten years after 
extinguishing hunting and fishing rights in ANCSA. By passing 
the subsistence title of the Alaska National Interests Lands 
Conservation Act, Congress finally made good on promises which 
the Secretary of Interior and the state of Alaska had failed to 
keep. The environmental and cultural facts underlying the ANILCA 
subsistence debate remained unchanged from those reported by the 
Federal Field Commission some twelve years earlier: 
The Congress finds and declares that--
(1) the continuation of the opportunity for subsistence uses 
by rural residents of Alaska, including both Natives and 
non-Natives, on the public lands and by Alaska Natives on 
Native lands is essential to Native physical, economic, 
traditional, and cultural existence and to non-Native 
physical, economic, traditional, and social existence; 
(2) the situation in Alaska is unique in that, in most 
cases, no practical alternative means are available to 
replace the food supplies and other items gathered from fish 
and wildlife which supply rural residents dependent on 
subsistence uses ; 35 
Title VIII of ANILCA provides a priority for "subsistence 
uses" over sport and commercial uses of fish and wildlife 
resources on "public lands" in Alaska. 36 Subsistence uses are 
defined as: 
the customary and traditional uses by rural Alaska residents 
of wild, renewable resources for direct personal or family 
consumption as food, shelter, fuel, clothing, tools, or 
transportation; for the making and selling of handicraft 
articles out of nonedible byproducts of fish and wildlife 
resources taken for personal or family consumption; and for 35 43 U. S.C. § 3111; cf., FEDERAL FIELD COMMITTEE, 
note 27 at 50-62. 
36 16 u.s.c. § 3114. 
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supra 
customary trade. 37 
When all uses of wildlife resource outstrip the ability of the 
resource to sustain healthy populations, ANILCA provides a 
preference for subsistence use requiring restrictions on 
commercial and sports uses as the first line of conservation 
before limiting any subsistence use. If conservation requires, 
as a second step, the pool of subsistence users is reduced in 
number based on customary dependence on the resource, residence 
and availability of alternative resources. 38 
In the spirit of "cooperative federalism, " the state of 
Alaska could enact laws consistent with the federal subsistence 
title and thereby retain fish and wildlife management authority 
for subsistence uses on most federal land in the state. 39 The 
state complied, more or less, 40 with the federal law and for the 
37 
38 
Id. § 3113. 
Id. 
39 Id. § 3115(d). See, Section 6(e) of the Alaska 
Statehood Act, Pub. L. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (7 July 1958), which 
maintained federal control over wildlife resources on federal 
lands in Alaska only until "after the Secretary of the Interior 
certifies to the Congress that the Alaska State Legislature has 
made adequate provision for the administration, management, and 
conservation of said resources in the broad national interest. " 
72 Stat. 341. Following Secretarial compliance certification of 
the state's fish and game statute on 27 April 1959, Hearings on 
H.R. 39 et al. Before the Subcomm. on General Oversight and 
Alaska Lands of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
95th Cong. , 1st Sess. part XI at 413 (1978), the President 
transferred jurisdiction to the state by Executive Order No. 
10857 (5 January 1960). 
40 But see, Madison v. Alaska Dept. of Fish and Game, 696 
P. 2d 168 (Alaska 1985) (Administrative regulations could not 
restrict subsistence priority to rural residents where the state 
subsistence statute did not restrict the priority to rural 
14 
past eight years has managed subsistence uses on most federal and 
state land in Alaska. 41 
The federally imposed ANILCA "subsistence standard" reflects 
two interdependent federal concerns. Congress expected ANILCA to 
result in both the conservation of fish and wildlife and the 
protection of the subsistence way of life by Alaska rural 
residents.42 Only conservation measures necessary due to 
imminent threats to subsistence resources gain priority over 
subsistence uses. 0 
Alaska's implementation of the ANI LCA priority has not gone 
unchallenged. Federal courts are exercising their oversight 
residents.) Following the Madison decision, the state leg­
islature amended the Alaska subsistence law to restrict the 
priority to rural residents. ALASKA STAT. § 16. 05.258, 
16.05.940 (30) (1986). 
41 Subsistence regulation on national parks and monuments 
remains under federal control with oversight by subsistence 
resource commissions made up of federal and state appointees, 
plus local subsistence users. 16 U.S.C. § 3118. 
42 The Congress finds and declares that --
··· (5) the national interest in the proper regulation, 
protection, and conservation of fish and wildlife on the public 
lands in Alaska and the continuation of the opportunity for a 
subsistence way of life by residents of rural Alaska require that 
an administrative structure be established for the purpose of 
enabling rural residents who have personal knowledge of local 
conditions and requirements to have a meaningful role in the 
management of fish and wildlife and of subsistence uses on the 
public lands in Alaska (emphasis added). 16 U.S.C. § 3111(5). 
43 If restricting sport and commercial uses is not 
sufficient to protect the continued viabilitity of fish and game 
populations, subsistence users can be limited based on the 
following individual criteria: "(1) customary and direct dependence 
upon the populations as the mainstay of livelihood; (2) local 
residency; and (3) the availability of alternative resources." 16 
u.s.c. § 3114. 
15 
role44 in numerous cases complaining of the state's failure 
properly to ensure the ANILCA subsistence priority.45 By and 
large, subsistence users have challenged the state's narrow view 
of the scope of the right protected by ANILCA and the state's 
broad view of its authority to restrict subsistence uses for 
conservation reasons or administrative efficiency . 46 
The fish and game management theory which Alaska would like 
to apply to subsistence uses bears a substantial resemblance to 
the unfettered regulatory authority it has historically exercised 
44 Id. § 3117(a). 
45 �, Kenaitze Indian Tribe v. state of Alaska, 860 
F. 2d 312 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 s.ct. 3187 (1989), on 
remand, No. A86-367 Civ. (D. Alaska) (Holland) (The state's 
definition of "rural area" overly restricted the areas which 
would otherwise be deemed rural by the ordinary meaning of the 
term--a geographic area with a small population); Tanana Fish and 
Game Association v. State of Alaska, No. F88-04 Civ. (D. 
Alaska) (Kleinfeld), on appeal, No. 88-4112 (9th Circuit) (Suit 
challenging the state's regulation prohibiting sale of roe from 
subsistence taken salmon as an unlawful restriction of customary 
trade authorized by ANILCA); Bobby v. Alaska, No. A84-544 Civ. 
(D. Alaska) (Holland) (Suit alleges that the state's individual 
game bag and periodic season limits do not accommodate 
subsistence uses where year round community use and sharing has 
been demonstrated); John v. Alaska, No. A85-698 Civ. 
(D. Alaska) (Holland) (Suit challenges the state's view that only a 
reasonable opportunity to subsist, whereby fishing at some 
traditional and customary fishing locations may be prohibited if 
in excess of "reasonable opportunity, is authorized by ANILCA."); 
Native Village of Tanana v. Cowper, No. F83-034 Civ. , and Tanana 
Chiefs Conference, Inc. v. Cowper, No. F83-402 
Civ. (D.Alaska) (Kleinfeld) (Companion cases challenge state arrests 
of individuals for taking or possessing game taken out of season. 
Among other claims, all defendants allege they took or possessed 
game for subsistence purposes--in Tanana for a traditional Native 
potlatch and in Ruby (TCC case) for a memorial potlatch). 
46 NOTE, supra note 8 at 431-438. 
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over sport and commercial uses of fish and game resources. 47 
The decision in Bobby v. Alaska48 illustrates the state' s failure 
to appreciate the difference between subsistence uses and other 
uses insofar as the application of season and bag limits are 
concerned: 
On their face, (state subsistence] regulations do not 
conflict with Alaska' s second subsistence law . . .  However, the 
court feels constrained, as a result of it review of the 
transcripts of the Board of Game hearings which are part of 
the record, to observe that the Board of Game must in the 
future proceed with scrupulous care and caution in imposing 
seasons and bag limits on subsistence hunting. Bag limits 
and seasons are game management tools which have seen 
extensive use in Alaska and nationally. These restrictions 
have typically, if not universally, been used to regulate 
sport hunting. In this case, bag limits and seasons are 
being applied to a very different type of game use. In its 
purest form, the subsistence lifestyle is quite literally 
the gaining of one's sustenance off the land. Typically, 
the sport hunter does not go hungry if the season ends 
without his taking any game or if he has taken and eaten his 
bag limit. The subsistence hunter who is without meat 
during the closed season or who has with his family consumed 
a fixed bag limit will go hungry unless some other game or 
47 
48 Bobby v. Alaska, No. A84-544 Civ. Memorandum of Decision 
(D. Alaska) (Holland) (14 February 1989). After numerous changes by 
the Board of game over a couple of years, the regulations 
challenged by the plaintiffs in Bobby set individual bag limits on 
caribou (5 per hunter) and moose (2 per hunter) and limited the 
seasons to three periods of time in the fall and winter. The Court 
reported the Board of Game "findings," upon which the Board based 
its regulations, as follows: " (1) that the residents of Lime 
Village are "extremely dependent on moose and caribou in (game 
management unit] 19 (A). " . . .  (2) that "the residents of Lime Village 
are probably the most geographically isolated and subsistence 
dependent people in the state. " . . .  (3) that moose and caribou were 
particularly important to Lime Village residents and that these 
animals "supply the highest proportion of the food eaten by 
residents of the area. " . . .  ( 4) that Lime Village residents have 
"customarily harvested moose and caribou on an opportunistic basis 
throughout the year. 11 • • •  (5) that the moose populations were stable 
and that the caribou population in the area was at a high level and 
growing. " Id. at 20-21. 
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fish are available and in season. Hunger knows nothing of 
seasons, nor is it satisfied for long after one's bag limit 
has been consumed.� 
Although the Court found that season and bag limits could be 
used by the state to regulate subsistence uses it found that 
significant limitations were imposed on the state's management 
discretion by the minimum federal standard mandated by ANILCA: 
If bag and seasons are imposed on subsistence hunting, there 
must be substantial evidence in the record that such 
restrictions are not inconsistent with customary and 
traditional uses of the game in question. It must be clear 
in the record that subsistence uses will be accomodated, as 
regards both the quantity or volume of use and the duration 
of the use. Need is not the standard. Again, it matters 
not that other food sources may be available at any given 
time or place. The standard is customary and traditional 
use of game ( emphasis added) . so 
The federal court did not find it necessary to discard the 
state's self-imposed statutory obligation to " provide a 
reasonable opportunity to satisfy subsistence uses. 1151 However, 
the court barely veiled its opinion of the statutory provision's 
value as a regulatory tool or standard: 
It is not clear to the court how [the reasonable opportunity 
standard] was intended to operate, nor how (if at all) the 
Board of Game has applied it in this case ... The court 
understands that the determination of the quantity of game 
which may be harvested consistent with recognized scientific 
49 
50 
Id. at 30-31. 
Id. at 32. John v. Alaska, No. A85-689 Civ. 
(D.Alaska) (Holland) raises similar issues as they relate to state 
management of subsistence fishing with the addition of a "location" 
issue -- can the state prevent subsistence uses at customary and 
traditional locations based on the same non-conservation based 
" reasonable opportunity" standard. 
51 § 6 (c), ch. 52, SLA 1986, AS 16. 05.258 (c). Of course, 
the state has used the provision more frequently to limit 
subsistence opportunities rather than to "provide" for them. 
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principles of game management involves professional judgment 
based upon surveys which cannot be exact or calculated with 
mathematical precision. The court further understands that 
successful hunting is partly skill and partly chance. It 
follows that subsistence hunters cannot be guaranteed that 
they will locate some predetermined number of moose or 
caribou in a given area and take them in a given period of 
time. All of the variables--the predictions, the skill, and 
chance--impact actual results. If the (reasonable 
opportunity standard) is reflective of the vagaries of the 
foregoing variables, it is no cause for particular concern 
at this time. However, if that language is meant to have a 
more specific meaning or impact on subsistence hunting, then 
the Board of Game must take care to evaluate and articulate 
the meaning they attribute to this language and take care 
that its implementation does not adversely impact the 
preference to which subsistence hunting is entitled under 
Alaska ' s  second subsistence law. 52 
In brief, the reasonable opportunity standard means nothing 
if it is inconsistent with the minimum federal standard imposed 
by ANILCA -- customary and traditional use of game. 
Neither ANILCA nor the state ' s  second subsistence law 
defines "customary and traditional use. '' The federal court 's 
approach to comprehending the term is to shift the burden to the 
state to quantify and qualify the standard by discovering its 
visible indices--what, when, how much, how long and, maybe, where 
does it take to "satisfy'' subsistence uses. The authors believe 
that these factors are merely the results or markers of active, 
self-regulating subsistence socio-economic, political systems. A 
customary and traditional use subsistence standard necessarily 
includes legal standards established by rural communities through 
custom, practice, or tribal codes or ordinances. 
52 
at 41. 
Bobby v. Alaska, No. A84-544 Civ. Memorandum of Decision 
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Although ANILCA protects both rural Native and non-Native 
subsistence use, it was clear to the drafters that it would be 
the Native communities and cultural systems which benefited most 
from the subsistence priority.53 To further clarify their 
intentions and authority, the drafters declared that as applied 
to Alaska Natives, ANILCA is "Indian legislation" enacted 
pursuant to the federal government's authority over tribal 
affairs under the Indian commerce clause of the United States 
t. t t. 54 Cons 1 u ion. 
53 Congressman Udall conceded that the rural residency 
requirement was intended primarily to benefit Natives due to the 
sheer number of them residing in rural areas: "Although I will 
address the operation of the subsistence priority later in my 
remarks, I raise the history of the subsistence priority here to 
point out that while the statutory allocation scheme is racially­
neutral, its application may result in instances in which 
significantly more Natives than non-Natives may be afforded 
access to a particular subsistence resource. Such a result will 
be consistent with a statutory approach based, as the subsistence 
title is, upon the constitutional authority of the Congress to 
manage Native affairs." 126 CONG. REC. H.10545 (Nov. 12, 1980). 
Although, Udall indicates earlier in his remarks that the 
"racially-neutral" approach was adopted on the insistence of the 
Governor of the State of Alaska, such treatment of rural 
"pioneer-type" non-Natives was a hallmark of early federal 
subsistence legislation which provided exemptions not only for 
Native subsistence but also for " miners, explorers and travelers 
on a journey when in need of food .. . , "  See�, Act of 7 June 
1902, supra note 21. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, cl. 8. Again Representative Udall 
explained the context of the subsistence bill: "[T] he 
subsistence title and the other subsistence provisions are 
included in recognition of the ongoing responsibility of the 
Congress to protect the opportunity for continued subsistence 
uses in Alaska by the Alaska Native people, a responsibility 
consistent with our well recognized constitutional authority to 
manage Indian affairs. 
Mr. Speaker, there is another significant reason to 
emphasize that the subsistence title and the subsistence 
provisions in other titles are enacted based upon our 
constitutional authority to manage Indian affairs. The so-called 
54 
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Congress recognized the competing uses of wildl ife resources 
in Al aska and, with ANILCA, set up a weighted priority system 
which ultimatel y favors subsistence uses. Congress intended to 
all ow Native communities to control their subsistence l ifestyl es 
and culture for as l ong as they chose to and so l ong as the 
resource coul d provide: 
As I have mentioned earlier, and as the subsistence titl e 
itself specifically  states, it is the intent of this 
l egislation to protect the Al aska Native subsistence way of 
l ife, and the Al aska Native culture of which it is a primary 
and essential el ement, for generation upon generation, for 
as l ong as the Al aska Native peopl e themselves choose to 
participate in that way of l ife, and to leave for the Al aska 
Native peopl e themselves, rather than to Federal and State 
resource managers, the choice as to the direction and pace, 
if any, of the evol ution of the subsistence way of l ife and 
of Al aska Native culture. 55 
Al aska's own Senator Stevens was wel l aware of the danger 
and unsavory outcomes which woul d resul t from assigning to 
federal bureaucrats the task of defining subsistence.56 Instead, 
"d-2" issue in general and the subsistence titl e and other 
subsistence provisions of this bill in particul ar, are derivative 
of the Alaska Native Cl aims Settl ement Act. The Federal courts 
have consistentl y recognized the Settl ement Act to be Indian 
l egisl ation, entitl ed to all of the l egal presumptions and 
statutory interpretations associated with that generic class of 
statutes. Whil e the Al aska National Interest Lands Conservation 
Act obviousl y is not Indian l egislation in its entirety, the 
subsistence titl e and the other subsistence rel ated provisions 
are. And under well -recognized canons of statutory construction, 
any ambiguities in the titl e and other provisions must be 
resol ved in favor of the Al aska Native peopl e." 126 CONG. REC. 
H.10545-56 ( Nov. 12, 1980) . 
55 
Udall ). 
126 CONG. REC. 29, 279-29, 280 ( 1980) ( Statement of Rep. 
56 In the markup session of the Senate 
Resource Committee Alaska Senator Ted Stevens 
Secretary' s  authority under House legislation 
determination will be made on an ethnic basis 
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Energy and Natural 
criticized the 
and predicted "the 
and be l imited to 
Congress defined the term in ANILCA57 and clearly stated its 
purpose: 
The purpose of this subchapter is to provide the opportunity 
for rural residents engaged in subsistence ways of life to 
do so.� 
But if Congress truly expected Native communities to retain 
the opportunity to maintain local subsistence practices and 
customs, with all of the cultural and social ordering connations, 
could it also expect the same Native communities to quit 
recognizing and ''enforcing" local traditional customs and rules 
which had sustained subsistence resources for millenia. Congress 
those persons who are welfare recipients." He urged committee 
members, "Don't come up with a provision that turns back to the 
federal government the right to perpetually define what is 
subsistence." PL 96-487 Alaska National Interest Lands and 
Conservation Act Legislative History Vol. 30, 180 (1981). 
Stevens viewed the bill as a "federal program to change the 
lifestyle of the Alaskan people in the bush area. It is 
predicated upon the goal of acculturation and predicated on the 
adjustment to a non-subsistence way of life, and predicated on 
doing away with the very thing which you, Jim Abourezk, and I 
would protect." Id. at 190. He characterized the draft 
legislation as " ( m] ore of a termination bill than anything I have 
ever seen'' and predicted "[W] e are going to see acculturation, 
change in lifestyle and someone sitting in Washington is going to 
decide what is genuinely subsistence oriented lifestyle. And 
that means if you work and earn enough money to buy a new 
snowmobile, for four or five months, you are no longer 
subsistence-oriented .. You are partly acculturated and you 
( sic] subsistence lifestyle will change .... I know it is going to 
happen if you let the federal government determine in 67 per cent 
of the area of the State what is or is not subsistence 
lifestyle." Id. at 191-92. The Committee then decided to 
refocus the appeals process in the federal courts rather than in 
the Secretary. 
57 
58 
16 u.s.c. § 3113. 
Id. at § 3112 (1). 
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saw that subsistence use activities were grounded in and by local 
self-regulating forces: 
However, the phrase "customary and traditional" is intended 
to place particular emphasis on the protection and 
continuation of the taking of fish, wildlife, and other 
renewable resources in areas of, and by persons (both Native 
and non-Native) resident in, areas of Alaska in which such 
uses have played a long established and important role in 
the economy and culture of the community and in which such 
uses incorporate beliefs and customs which have been handed 
down by word of mouth or example from generation to 
generation . 59 
The Senate Energy Committee Report alludes to this understanding 
in discussing the interpretation of healthy populations: 
The Committee intends the phrase conservation of healthy 
populations of fish and wildlife resources and their habitat 
in the condition which assures stable and continuing natural 
populations and species mix of plants and animals in 
relation to their ecosystems, including recognition that 
local rural residents engaged in subsistence uses may be 
part of that ecosystem; minimizes the likelihood or 
irreversible or long term adverse effects upon such 
populations and species; and ensures maximum practical 
59 H. Rep. No . 96-97, 96th Cong. , 1st Sess . part I at 279 
(1979). For example, ''[ a ) t  various times [ among the Native people 
of the Bering Straits villages) the chief would orate principles 
of conduct, which included reminders of the territorial limits to 
which a person could safely go, management of intratribal 
affairs . . .  and such homely details as tips about survival on 
turbulent sea ice, in a storm, or about the best ways to hunt hard­
to-get animals. The chief, in conjunction with the council, made 
rules and laws, saw that they were carried out, and arbitrated in 
both intratribal and intertribal affairs . . .  The chief and the 
council held many meetings to decide on various courses of action­
-for division of labor in cooperative ventures such as 
constructing . . .  a caribou corral; . . . procedure of dividing food 
during famine . . . The chief and the council also granted permission 
to other tribes for territorial use, and admonished their own 
tribal members about trespass into foreign territory. " Federal 
Field Committee, supra note 27 at 147. Of course, Alaska Native 
tribes are historically hunter/gather societies whose use and 
regulation of territory was largely concerned with hunting, 
gathering and trade purposes. 
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diversity of options for the future . . . (emphasis added) . 60 
Thus the passage of federal Indian or Native subsistence 
legislation normally is founded upon the theory that Native 
systems of laws found in traditional customs and practices or 
modern codes are capable of sustaining fish and wildlife 
populations over long periods of time. 61 Protection of Alaska 
Native subsistence uses in ANILCA fits this theory: 
The House notes that the Alaska Native people have been 
living a subsistence way of life for thousands of years, and 
that the Alaska Native way of life in rural Alaska may be 
the last major remnant of the subsistence culture alive 
today in North America .. . 62 
The policy goal of all federal Indian hunting and fishing 
laws, including Alaska Native subsistence legislation, is to 
preserve activities and cultural systems (i. e. Native ways of 
life) which underlie Indian or Native subsistence uses. In most 
situations , including those referred to as examples for the 
ANILCA Native subsistence protections,63 the United States used 
60 
61 
See S. REP . NO. 413, 96th Cong . ,  Sess. 2 33 (197_). 
supra note 1. 
62 126 CONG. REC. 29,274 (Nov. 12, 1980) (Comments of 
Rep. Udall). 
63 In discussing Alaska Native subsistence use in the 
National Park System, Representative Udall reflected on the 
Congress ' treatment of other Indian tribes as examples to follow: 
"In other instances, because of their unique significance to 
the Nation the Congress has authorized the continuation of 
certain uses within new parks and monuments which would be 
prohibited under traditional National Park Service management 
policies . For example, in Hawaii Volcanoes National Park and the 
Big Cypress National Preserve certain types of subsistence 
activities are authorized to continue as a result of 
congressional recognition of their cultural significance. In 
both units subsistence activities within the park and preserve 
24 
t raditional federal Indian law mechanisms of on and off­
reservation Indian hunting and fishing rights as the means to 
order and provide for the management of the protected rights. 
Both on and off-reservation models clearly incorporate 
t ribal law and regulatory authority as a necessary condition for 
the survival of Indian traditional and customary hunting and 
fishing practices and lifestyles.M Could Congress truly expect 
Alaska Native subsistence ways of life to survive, as it so 
profusely claimed to be its goal, without also preserving 
community derived tribal law as the minimum federal subsistence 
standard to guide state implementation and federal oversight of 
ANILCA?65 After all, ANILCA is premised on the fact that the 
were specifically linked by the Congress to culturally distinct 
groups of people: Native Hawaiians at the Volcanoes Park, and 
the Miccosukee and Seminole Indian tribes of Florida in Big 
Cypress ... " Id. 
M The Miccosukee and Seminole Indian Tribes referred to 
in the ANILCA legislative history retain the rights "subject to 
reasonable regulations established by the Secretary of Interior, 
to continue their usual and customary use and occupancy of 
Federal or federally acquired lands and waters within t he [Big 
Cypress) preserve and the Addition, including hunting, fishing, 
and trapping on a subsistence basis and traditional tribal 
ceremonials. " 16 U. S. C .  § 698j ( Supp. V 1987) Tribal law 
applies within the Seminole reserve acquired in a land claims 
settlement in 1987. 25 u . s. c. § 1772, 1772d. (d) (3) {Supp. V 
1987) . 
65 See infra part II. Contemporary Native experts 
recognized the challenge of a subsistence regime mandated and 
enforced by authority other than their own, "The fate of 
subsistence lies not so much in the performance of the hunter 
pursuing his game at the village level, but rather within the 
regional, stat e  and national development whose policies, laws 
regulations impinge to a greater degree than ever on rural 
environments. " WORL, supra note 52 at 6. 
25 
and 
prior state and federal regimes were not working. As observed by 
Strickland on Alaska Natives: 
As long as it is important to Native communities in Alaska 
that they control membership, sanction individual conduct 
through customary law, and regulate affairs or property that 
are uniquely tribal, such as descent and distribution and 
subsistence activity, tribal entities [and tribal law) must 
be kept viable. 66 
IV. ANILCA Compared With Off-Reservation I ndian Hunting and 
Fishing Rights 
Despite the unique management role Congress assigned to the 
State of Alaska, 67 the subsistence use priority and the scope of 
the State's authority under ANILCA differ very little from that 
found in other federal I ndian laws protecting off-reservation 
Indian hunting and fishing. We assume that federal laws and 
treaties preserve "Indian" hunting and fishing rights and include 
various generic legal components necessary to protect and foster 
the underlying Native subsistence systems and lifestyles. This 
section compares ANILCA with typical off-reservation I ndian 
hunting and fishing rights to determine to what extent ANILCA 
contains these generic components, including tribal law which 
66 COHEN, supra note 9 at 755. 
67 Genesis of the notion to delegate managment authority 
to the state can be traced to comments made by Congressman 
Seiberling in which he suggested that one way to ensure the 
subsistence priority " would be for the Federal Government to do 
what we did in the strip mining law, to lay down conditions 
governing management of game on Federal lands and then say if the 
state were willing to meet those conditions we would turn over 
that management to the State. " Hearings on H.R. 39 et al. Before 
the Subcomm. on General Oversight and Alaska Lands of the House 
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong. , 1st Sess. , 
part XI at 155-156 (197 8). 
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either governs or defines subsistence activity. 
A.  Statutory Construction of the Right 
ANILCA represents a treaty substitute.68 ANCSA extinguished 
Native hunting and fishing rights based on aboriginal title. 
Just as Congress can diminish, modify, alter or terminate 
aboriginal rights so can it restore them. 69 Ambiguities in the 
ANILCA subsistence title and other subsistence provisions "must 
be resolved in favor of the Alaska Native people, " but the 
restoration c haracter of the statute probably prevents 
application of "reserved rights" interpretation standards 
normally applied to federal laws restricting Indian rights.70 
Thus, Alaska Native rights under ANILCA will likely be restricted 
to those specifically granted by Congress rather than those "not 
68 
(1987). 
See, C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND LAW 8 
69 �, Menominee Restoration Act of 1973, Pub. L .  No. 
93-197, 87 Stat. 770 (Codified at 25 u.s.c. § §  903-903f). 
70 As an aid to judicial construction of statutes and 
treaties terminating or restricting Indian rights, "courts 
emphasized the origin of the right as being reserved from a 
cession made by Indians to the federal government rather than as 
being granted to the Indians from the federal government. "  COHEN, 
supra note 9 at 35 citing, United States v. Winans, 198 U. S.  371, 
381 (1905). The "reserved rights" analysis does have application 
in this context if one focuses upon the never extinguished right 
of Alaska Native Villages to protect their way of life. It 
appears that Congress revived subsistence, an explicitly 
extinguished aboriginal right, in order to reinforce tribal 
cultural authority. The legislative history binds subsistence 
(the extinguished right) to protection of the Native way of life 
(the unextinguished right). If this is correct, it adds f urther 
strength to the argument that Congress' definition of subsistence 
is a core attribute of the right now protected. 
27 
granted to the United States by the tribes. 11 71 
B. Tribal Versus Individual and Family Rights 
Off-reservation Indi an hunting and fishi ng rights are group 
property rights held collectively by the tri bes.72 ANILCA limits 
subsistence uses granted by the Act to those resulting i n  
"personal or family consumption.11 73 "Fami ly" means: 
all persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption, or anx 
person living within the household on a permanent basi s ... 4 
Thi s definition of "family" i s  broad enough to include the 
extended or clan oriented family structures upon which Alaska 
Native culture i s  founded. Extended and clan based families 
consider themselves related by blood, adoption or marriage and 
are thus encompassed within the ANILCA definition.75 
The distinction between a tri bal and an individual right 
becomes criti cal only when determi ning who gets paid for an 
71 Id. Some Alaska Native groups may still possess 
hunting and fishing rights whi ch consti tuted permanent property 
rights at the time of ANCSA's extinguishment of rights based on 
"bare" aboriginal rights, GETCHES, supra note 6 at 9. 
72 
73 
74 
United States v. Dann, 105 S.Ct. 1058 (1985). 
16 u .s.c. § 3113. 
Id. at § 3113 (1) . 
75 CASE, supra note 15, Chapter Eight. An administrative 
hearing followed the voluntary dismissal of Native Vi llage of 
Tanana v. Cowoer, supra note 45. Preci sely this use of the term 
was presented to the Board of Game by Eliza Jones, an Athabascan 
cultural expert, in  the Native Village of Tanana's Nuchalawoyya 
subsistence proposal to show that the Alaska Nati ve family 
spanned beyond vi llage boundari es through clan affili ations. 
Indeed, limiting the term to nuclear fami li es attri butes a 
terrninationist motive to ANILCA whi ch was strongly rejected by 
Alaska's Senator Stevens, supra note 56. 
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extinguished interest and when deciding who can enforce or 
protect the right in court. The distinction is meaningless as it 
relates to compensation for the taking of subsistence land and 
resources -- ANCSA terminated the former, and ANILCA specifically 
denies that subsistence privileges transfer any property right to 
subsistence resources.n Most traditional Alaska Native 
societies assigned these limited property interests to c lans and 
extended family households thus making the ANILCA right an 
accommodation to, rather than an abrogation of, tribal law. 
Tribal versus individual or family rights is a distinction 
without meaning where those rights are enforced in federal 
courts. A tribal member's right to exercise communal fishing 
rights provides standing to sue to protect it.77 Tribes can also 
defend the rights of individual members in a civil proceeding. 78 
Aggrieved local residents, other persons and organizations can 
sue to enforce the ANILCA subsistence priority.79 Alaska tribes 
also may sue to enforce their members' ANILCA subsistenc e rights, 
and, according to one court, enjoy parens patriae standing "to 
76 16 u . s . c .  § 3125 (1) (1985). Compensation may be 
available, however, for the taking or interference with the 
privilege or opportunity to subsist. 
n 
78 
79 
COHEN, supra note 9. 
Puyallup III ,  433 U. S. 170, 171. 
16 U. S.C.§ 3117( a). 
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prevent a violation of federal laws by federal agencies. "M 
C. Scope of the Right or Priority 
Off-reservation fishing rights typically reserved the right 
at a tribe 's "usual and accustomed grounds and stations in common 
with all Citizens of the Territory. 11 81 By comparison, ANILCA 
protects subsistence uses for Native and non-Native rural 
residents on public lands in Alaska, including state lands where 
management responsibility is accepted by the state. 82 
Tribal members are deemed to possess an easement over 
private and public lands to gain access to and exercise off­
reservation hunting and fishing rights at their usual and 
accustomed grounds and stations. 83 ANILCA on the other hand 
authorizes access to federal and state lands but not private 
80 Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F. 2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988), 
on remand, A86-083 Civ. (D. Alaska) (von der Heydt). The Federal 
District Court so held in an unpublished opinion. Memorandum and 
Order at 24-26 (Nov. 21, 1986) The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
lower court in all respects on September 21, 1988; See �, of 
lawsuits filed by the Kenaitze Indian Tribe and the Native 
Village of Tanana. supra note 45. 
81 COHEN, supra note 9, Ch. 8, Sec. B3b-d. The members of 
the Miccosukee and Seminole Tribes of Indians enj oy the right to 
their usual and customary hunting, fishing and trapping on a 
subsistence basis on all lands under federal jurisdiction on the 
Big Cypress Preserve and Addition. 16 u.s.c. § 698j. 
82 
83 
16 u.s.c. § §  3113, 3114. 
COHEN, supra note 9 at Ch. 8, Sec. B3 . 
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lands.M Nevertheless, Native access to subsistence resource 
lands is quite secure since less than five per cent of all land 
in Alaska is held privately by non-Natives (ten per cent is held 
by Natives through their ANCSA c orporations and the remainder is 
federal and state public land.) 
Off-reservation rights must be shared in common with non­
Natives and non-tribal members. Treaty tribes are due their 
" fair share of the resource" which may be no more than fifty per 
cent of the resource. 85 The tribes' share can be harvested for 
subsistence or commercial uses without restriction beyond the 
ultimate protection of the resource. 
By comparison, ANILCA provides an absolute priority for 
Native and non-Native subsistence uses. Limited commercial uses 
are allowed for barter and customary trade so long as the 
commerce is not "significant. 11 86 
Non-treaty and tribal treaty users of the resource must 
share equally in harvest level restrictions due to poor runs. 
Tribal law determines how the reduced treaty allocation will be 
16 u . s . c . § 3114, 3115(d). The limitation excluding 
private lands will not significantly affect Natives so long as 
access remains available to private lands held by ANCSA 
corporations and land disposal s and the State does not dispose of 
inordinate amounts of public land around rural villages. 
85 COHEN, supra note 9 at 453-455. 
86 See, Tanana Fish and Game Association v. State of 
Alaska, No. F88-04 civ. (D.Alaska) (Kleinfeld), on appeal, No. 88-
4112 (9th Cir.) . The lawsuit challenges a State regulation which 
makes sale of subsistence salmon roe a crime on the grounds that 
the regulation violates Section 804 of ANILCA. 
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apportioned to the members. Under ANILCA, as reviewed above, all 
non-subsistence resource users must be restricted before 
restrictions apply to subsistence users. Once conservation of 
the resource requires limits on subsistence uses a federal 
allocation scheme must be followed. Allocations among individual 
ANILCA subsistence users is determined by customary and direct 
dependence on the resource, local residence and the availability 
of alternative resources. 87 There is no guarantee that these 
factors will replicate local community norms governing fish and 
game allocations in time of scarcity. 
D. Law Applied 
Off-reservation treaty rights tribes and ANILCA subsistence 
user communities both live with the notion that "another 
sovereign is afoot." Indians normally are subject to all state 
laws when off the reservation if the state law is not preempted 
by another federal law. M Courts, however, have held that states 
can only regulate off-reservation tribal fishing rights in order 
to preserve the resource. 89 Where the tribe institutes an 
adequate tribal conservation system, it can preempt state 
regulation indefinitely. 90 
87 
M 
89 
90 
Supra note 43. 
Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60 (1962). 
COHEN, supra note 9 at 451 n. 36. 
Id. at Ch.8, Sec. Cl. 
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ANILCA - also authorizes state regulation of subsistence when 
necessary to prevent wasteful subsistence uses and to conserve 
the resource in conformity with the priority afforded to 
subsistence uses.91 If no threat to the resource exists, the 
state cannot impose any regulation that is inconsistent with the 
minimum federal standard applied by ANILCA and adopted by the 
state 's subsistence law--customary and traditional subsistence 
use of game.� 
Tribal regulation pursuant to tribal law is not specifically 
mandated by ANILCA.93 Instead, the state must, in some way, 
incorporate the minimum federal standard imposed by ANILCA-­
customary and traditional use of fish and game--into its 
subsistence management scheme. 
91 16 u.s.C.§§ 3112, 3114. 
92 Bobby v. Alaska, No. A84-544 Civ. (D.Alaska) (Holland) 
Ruling on summary Judgment (February 14, 1989) (State season and 
bag limits are permissible only when consistent with customary 
and traditional uses.) acc' d, John v. State, No. A85-698 Civ. 
(D.Alaska) (Holland). States face suits by tribal members, the 
tribes and the United States for failure to live by treaty right 
restrictions on its authority to regulate tribal treaty rights. 
Alaska faces the same litigation threat under ANILCA and may have 
its subsistence jurisdiction over off-reservation, federal public 
lands revoked if its laws fail to provide the protections require 
by ANILCA. 16 U.S.C. § 3115 (d). It will also pay prevailing 
subsistence users their attorneys ' fees and costs. 
93 But that is not to say that tribal authority may not 
exist based on some other legal grounds, or could otherwise be 
authorized based on a delegation of authority from the state or 
federal government. Another difference, between ANILCA and off­
reservation treaty rights, is the lower level of commercial trade 
allowed by ANILCA. 
33 
Following the decision in Bobby, the state' s subsistence 
regulations must be consistent with the actual customs and 
practices of Alaska ' s  rural subsistence users. The source of 
these subsistence traditions and customs are the evolved 
customary practices, laws, norms and values of Native hunting and 
gathering societies. Thus the applicable law both in Alaska and 
in the off-reservation Indian treaty situation, is tribal law or 
its state " clone. " 
ANILCA provides a mechanism which can lead to the discovery 
of these community derived "subsistence" laws. The state is 
required to form a community advisory boards and a regional 
council system staffed by rural residents with personal knowledge 
of local conditions and requirements in order to identify 
subsistence uses, evaluate subsistence needs, recommend 
regulatory strategies to accommodate subsistence uses and needs 
and recommend specific policies, standards, guidelines and 
regulations to implement the strategies. 94 Though it may be 
theoretically possible for these boards and councils to come up 
with a management strategy and proposed regulations reflective 
of, but alien to, customary and traditional subsistence uses, it 
is undoubtedly easier for them simply to discover and apply what 
already works in rural Alaska.95 
94 16 u . s . c .  § 3 1 15 ( a )  ( 3 ) . 
95 Proposal # 26 submitted by the Arcticf Regl�al Council, J 
the Village of Noatak, and the Village of Noorvik to the Board of 
Game on 14 S eptember 1988 proposed to exempt residents from 
regulations governing subsistence hunting, including bag limits, 
seasons, and methods and means restrictions. The tribal and 
3 4  
Thus, to the extent that rural communities maintain 
subsistence economies which efficiently regulate themselves, the 
state will, at the very least, be restricted to applying the 
functional equivalent of local community derived tribal l aw. The 
community will 1{�-��_-=_st) this law by its faithful practice of 
customary and traditional subsistence activities.96 
V. How Are customary and Traditional Subsistence Practices 
Guided By Tribal Law? 
Although the statutory definition focused upon those persons 
eligible for participation in subsistence culture, the detailed 
definition of that culture itself was left for local advisory 
committees to discover and report to regional councils and, 
ultimately, to a joint board of fish and game.97 The reason was 
obvious. Subsistence culture, as varied as Alaska Native 
communities, had been defined by each place to meet community 
municipal communities would pass ordinances prohibiting waste and 
provide for data collection. 
Tribal communities could be even more aggressive by 
identifying their respective subsistence oriented customs and 
traditions independent of local community advisory boards. Tribal 
reviews could take the form of resolutions, ordinances or even 
codes. Tribes have already identified their "legal" practices in 
attempts to gain passage of subsistence regulations in the boards 
of fish and game. Id. � � � � �� Jj.. 9.JJl:t �� 
96 
97 Nothing of the kind has actually happened. Arguably the� -
ANILCA subsistence scheme only relies on the boards and councils 
to review regulatory proposals. In  practice, underfunding and 
disproportionate numbers of sport and commercial user board members 
undermine the part this system was to play in preserving 
subsistence use in Alaska. Rural Alaska Community Action Program, 
Inc., Results of a Survey: Implementation of ANILCA's Subsistence 
Priority and Advisory Committee System by the State of Alaska 
(September 1989) . 
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needs. 
What state officials have failed to appreciate is  that 
subsi stence culture formed the core of aboriginal law of discrete 
Alaska Native cultural groups. 98 As a legal process,  i t  was the 
most active component of tribal law. 99 However, the state has 
confused the explicit definition of eligibility for rural 
indivi duals, both Native and non-Native, who might participate i n  
subsistence with the substantive content of subsistence i tself. 
As characterized by Gail Osherenko: " [T)he i ndigenous 
system of wildlife management is  a collection of unwritten rules 
or soci al norms that govern Native hunting, fishing and trapping. 
The rules have been handed down by example and orally for 
generations. For the most part, compliance, based on cultural 
values, ethics, and even taboos, has been high.11 100 
Ethnographers of Alaska Native cultures have described i n  
detai l thes e community constructs and codified the rules which 
govern when to hunt, where to hunt, how to hunt and the terms 
98 For an extended discussion of traditional political and 
legal organization among traditional Alaska Native societi es see 
A. Shinkwin i n  CASE, supra note 15 at 333-370 (1984) (hereinafter 
Shi nkwin). 
Although Donald Black, i n  BEHAVIOR OF LAW (1976), 
vi ewed North American Indians and Eskimos as normally dependent 
on soci al control and not on law, he observed that governmental 
soci al control (or law) increased during s ubsi stence activities .  
Black at 89-90. 
100 
Arctic: 
and L. N. 
Resource 
G.  Osherenko, Wildlife Management in  the North American 
The Case for Co-Management, 92-103, 93 i n  M.R. Freeman 
Carbyn eds . , Traditional Knowledge and Renewable 
Management in  Northern Regions 92-103, 93 (1988). 
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under which game must be shared. 101 Yet rules and procedures 
governing hunting and fishing activity are rarely codified among 
any group, so well known are they. 102 
101 See, �, Edward Moffat Weyer, The Eskimos 17 3-91 
(1932). The impact of collective rural interests on game sharing 
and other property interests which arise from settlement life are 
described by Marcell Mauss in his famous study, Seasonal 
Variations of the Eskimo, A Study in Social Morphology (1905-6) 
(English translation by J.J. Fax, 197 9). In his review of 19th 
century literature, he assesses a dichotomy between law governing 
village life the in the winter and camp life in the summer. Id. 
at 62-7 5. In his circumpolar analysis, Mauss notes the 
interaction of winter and summer jural systems. Id. at 74. 
Since permanent villages characterize Alaska Native life, his 
descriptions of the strong community influences over game 
distribution in the settlement suggest that they carryover more 
significantly there than in other places. See Mauss citing 
Schanz in R. Porter, Report on the Population and Resources of 
Alaska at the 11th Census, 1980 106 (1893) and I. Petroff, Report 
on the Population, Industries and resources of Alaska, Tenth 
Census of the United States 125ff (1884 ). 
While H. Noble describes the norms defined and enforced 
against fellow villagers as a system of law, she concludes that 
"[ I) t has not been generally recognized as such, due to its 
unwritten nature and non-institutionalized methods of 
implementation." NOBLE, supra note 3 at 240. In fact, the level 
of institutionalization through use of extra-familial authority 
figures as well as the means of enforcement ranging from peer 
pressure and reeducation to ostracism and banishment varies 
across Alaska Native cultures and is much dependent on level of 
societal structure, numbers of family or clan groups within the 
residential social unit, culture change, seasonal variations and 
game populations or fish sought for subsistence. See Shinkwin 
supra note 15 for a detailed replication of Southeast Alaska 
Indians, North Athabaskan Indians, Aleuts, Inupiat and Yupik 
Eskimos. See also E. Burch, Jr., "Subsistence Production in 
Kivalina Alaska: A Twenty Year Perspective" (ADF&G Subsistence 
Division Technical Paper No. 128, 1985) and R. Wolfe, J. Gross, 
s. Langdon, J. Wright, G. Sherrod, and L. Ellana, " Subsistence­
Based Economies in Coastal Communities of Southwest Alaska" 
(Alaska Department of Fish and Game Division of Subsistence 
Technical Paper No. 89, 1983). For an examination of seasonal 
variations see L. Pospisil, Anthropology of Law: A Comparative 
Theory 101 (197 1). 
102 
That subsistence tribal law, and its dynamic underpinnings, 
has been relegated to the work of economic anthropologists and 
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j 
Many hunting and gathering groups had been placed on 
'>-
reserves before ethnogrophies began.103 Additionally, their 
training and the imperatives of mentors who sent fledgling 
anthropologists into the field caused them to focus on the 
not political or legal anthropologists may have been its saving 
grace if the determined efforts by outside governments to change 
substantive law and procedure as well as the mechanisms for 
enforcement of tribal law governing criminal and civil disputes 
are any indication of the impulse and imperatives of culture 
change in Alaska. See Hippler and Conn, "Traditional Athabascan 
Law Ways and Their Relationship to Contemporary Problems of 'Bush 
Justice, 1 11 7 ISEGR Occasional Papers (1972); Hippler and Conn, 
"Traditional Eskimo Law Ways and Their Relationship to 
Contemporary Problems of ' Bush Justice, 1 11 10 ISEGR Occasional 
Paper (1973 ); and Conn and Hippler, The Village Council and Its 
Offspring: A Reform for Bush Justice, 5 UCLA-Alas. L. Rev. 22 
(1975). 
103 That all Arctic ethnographers did not characterize 
subsistence culture as an explicitly legal process of the studied 
group relates more to anthropology ' s  retarded professional 
development of appropriate ways to discover law among hunting and 
gathering groups with limited institutionalized legal forms than 
to the absence of a legal underpinning for subsistence. L. Nader, 
The Anthropological Study of Law, The Ethnology of Law 6 7  
American Anthropologist Special Publication Part 2, 1-27 (1965). 
Although jurists have long used evidence of indigenous use and 
occupancy of land to establish territoriality, a protracted 
debate marked by contrasting tendencies to define nearly every 
social rule as law or to find law only where Western-like 
institutions existed caused students of culture to give this 
social process less emphasis than it deserved. In fairness to 
students of subsistence in culture, their focus on economic and 
spiritual determinants as well as critical links between kinship 
and subsistence rather than on legal rules and procedures made 
sense. Not only was subsistence guided initially by nonlegal 
cultural forms and needs and only, secondarily, recast as law, 
but the tightly interwoven relationship between law and these 
other determinants made a discrete analysis of the influence of 
tribal law an exercise in exaggeration or in futility. Even 
modern ethnographies have been criticized for extracting law from 
other social control systems, leaving the reader to place law 
back into its social and cultural context. Nader Id. at 18 
(1965). on the history of law in anthropology see 
Differentiation of Ethnojurisprudence and Ethnopolitics, F. 
Voget, A History of Ethnology 697-705 (1975). 
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economic or social but not the legal content of subsistence.1� 
still anthropologists have found in indigenous subsistence every 
element of law: well-defined obligations, or intragroup 
understandings, authoritative guidance from ongoing leadership or 
from leadership which emerges from coordinated subsistence 
activities, and sanctions for willful violation of obligations 
which range from reeducation of offenders to banishment from the 
group. 105 
Subsistence practice as a pattern of appropriate secular 
conduct is buttressed by nonlegal beliefs, especially by  
spiritual concerns with group relationships to both the land and 
animal life. 106 Thus, conduct as a subsistence practitioner is 
defined by norms, both legal and non-legal, that reinforce one 
another. Because violations of appropriate subsistence practices 
can result in supernatural sanctions against not only the hunter, 
but his community through the loss of game or other tragedies, 
these non-legal norms are necessarily "double institutionalized" 
104 But see, N. Gubser, THE NUNAMIUT ESKIMOS, HUNTERS OF 
CARIBOU ( 1965) , for an example of an ethnographic focus on legal 
and political leadership among Anaktuvuk Pass Eskimos, a focus 
prompted by Gubser's mentor, Pospisil. 
(C� .()5 105 L. Pospisil, The Ethnology of Law, 2nd Ed. (1978). 
N. H. Graburn, Eskimo Law in Light of Self and Group Interest, 4 
Law & Society Review 45 (1960) : M. Lantis, Factionalism and ✓ Leadership: A Case Study of Nunivak Island, 9 Arctic 
- Anthropology 43 (1972) 0 andAl, Gubser, 'l)he-..Nupamj..ut: Eak� 
Hunters_ of -C.ar ibo'!-C- l.J�6--5 ) . 
106 S. J. Langdon, Alaska Native Subsistence: Current 
Regulatory Regimes and Issues Vol. 19 Alaska Native Review 
Commission 16-17 (1984). 
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J (,t, i 
and enforced through secular means as well as supernatural for 
the good of the group. 107 Communities cannot afford to allow 
deviants to trigger tragedies which impact a cosmological 
relationship between the people and the animal (or fish) 
population. 108 
Core social values said to be at the heart of Native 
community life have their roots in the relationship between the 
indigenous population and the wildlife it harvests for 
subsistence. The impetus to share, the impetus to cooperate and 
the values which determine right conduct, right leadership and 
appropriate intragroup relations are all tied to appropriate 
subsistence b ehavior. 109 Ceremonial life, designation of leaders 
and social relations find their inner logic within the 
107 Double institutionalization is the process by which 
customs derived from other social processes are 
" reinstitutionalized within the legal institution (s) so that 
/ society can continue to function in an orderly manner on the J basis of rules so maintained. " P. Bohannan, The .£i_ffering_�ealms \ _ ; of Law 43-56 at 48 in P. Bohannon ed. Law and Warfare (1967) - Co�� Y Bohann·an thus distinguishes legal obligations from mere customs 
based on reciprocity and publicity or other forms of social 
control from which law is derived and further suggests a dynamic 
interaction between law and other primary social institutions. 
108 on cosmological cycling among Yupik Eskimo see A. 
FIENUP-RIORDAN, THE NELSON ISLAND ESKIMO (1983). 
109 Langdon notes that networks of distribution of 
subsistence, based on extended kinship and friendship n etworks 
and "mandated by norms of sharing and reciprocity" [ assure) "that 
the elderly, infirm, handicapped and unsuccessful are provided 
for. " s. Langdon, Lime Village: subsistence and Appropriate 
Management in an Alaska Native Village. Unpublished discussion 
paper prepared for Alaska Legal Services April, 1987 at 7. Such 
instrumental social norms are challenged by state-mandated bag 
limits on skilled hunters. Id. at 8. 
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, 1 1 0  su sistence process. 
Congress, the courts and claims commissions have each 
understood tribal indigenous management of wildlife to be a 
manifestation of political authority. Federal Indian law has 
consistently confirmed claims to aboriginal title and to 
political control over territory based on established hunting and 
gathering activities on the territorial domain.1 1 1  Customary use 
of traditional locations by individuals and families also formed 
the basis for allocation of individual rights to allotments.1 1 2  
These assertions of ownership are property rights interconnected 
to and recognized within the community' s  subsistence culture and 
protected by its internal tribal law. To the extent that 
treaties and other reservation of rights replaced aboriginal 
rights to land, they often worked serious harm upon the 
underlying aboriginal subsistence culture that gave meaning to 
these communal and individual property rights. Rarely did 
1 10  "Subsistence activities link the generations and the 
extended family into a complex network of association, rights and 
obligations. This network both reflects and re-creates the 
social order and gives meaning and value to each person ' s  
contributions and rewards. I have observed in village Alaska 
that whether they hold office or not, leaders are men and women 
who provide for the needs of others in the village. Good hunters 
who share their harvests have always been identified as village 
leaders. Order in a village based on subsistence activities 
depends upon earned respect and consensus, not on authority and 
coercion." BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY. THE REPORT OF THE ALASKA 
NATIVE REVIEW COMMISSION 52-53 (1985). 
1 1 1  on use of hunting and fishing to establish original 
Indian title to land. See COHEN, supra note 9 at 442. 
1 1 2  Id. at 457. 
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subsistence boundaries and boundaries set by legisl ative grants 
or treaties coincide. 113 The jurisdiction of the new tribal l and 
base and aboriginal wildlife domain were different, opening the 
way for disputes over off-reservation hunting and fishing rights. 
Congress's decision to rel egitimize the aboriginal hunting 
and fishing rights it extinguished in ANCSA through federally 
enforceabl e rights, proscribed only by conservation of the 
resource, made good sense in the Al aska context. Land 
all ocations to Alaska Native vil lages did not encompass 
completely the traditional hunting grounds of Al aska Native 
groups. 114 Much of that hunting ground was in l and that came to 
be designated as federal national parks and wilderness areas. 
Thus, Congress separated the boundaries of the subsistence 
cul ture from the boundaries of public l ands it demarcated and 
awarded to Native vill age corporations, l eaving it to those who 
defined subsistence culture to maintain those original cul tural 
boundaries. 1 1 5  
Pressures upon subsistence as a tribal l egal and c ul tural 
process had begun even before the state began to manage it as a 
113 SUTTON, INDIAN LAND TENURE 57  (1975 ). 
114 The Field commission had drawn clear maps of many 
subsistence-based territories which predicted this point. 
FEDERAL FIELD COMMITTEE, supra note 27. 
115  After serious debate Congress gave the federal courts and 
not the Secretary of Interior primary authority for eval uation of 
state conduct in discovering and in protecting subsistence rights. 
It  suspected that the Secretary would impose his own global 
definition of subsistence and subsistence users upon the vill ages 
and state. supra note 5 6. 
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condition of managing wildlife resources on all public l and. 
Technological innovations, population growth and periodic 
enforcement of a conflicting system of federal and state fish and 
game laws each served to destabi l ize the indigenous process.1 1 6  
Subsistence legal cultures sometimes responded with experiments 
that made their own legal practices more Western and therefore 
more legitimate in the eyes of young Natives and of federal and 
state legal agencies. They established commissions, drafted 
rules and codes of conduct and sought accords with wildlife 
agencies.1 1 7  These modern efforts demonstrated that the 
indigenous legal systems were capable of confronting new 
challenges , both internal and external, through adaptation. 
Cooperation with indigenous legal systems will not come 
easily for a state reluctant to lend credence to processes which 
demonstrate continuing vil lage autonomy (and even sovereignty) by 
their very success. A rigid process leading to the incorporation 
of custom into a state legal process as will be seen, disrupts 
that indigenous process by separating indices of indigenous l aw 
from sources of that same law which shade and adapt it to 
1 16  Osherenko supra note 100. 
1 17 conn and Langdon describe several modern experiments in 
game management where vil lagers codified and enforced rules 
within their groups and among neighbors as a direct extension of 
customary regimes. See S. Conn and S.L. Langdon, Retribalization 
As a Strategy for Achievement of Group and Individual Social 
Security in Alaska Native Villages - with special focus on 
z subsistence in F. von Benda Beckmann, K. von Benda Beckmann, E. r casino, F. Hirtz, G.R. Woodman and H.F . Zacher (eds.) Between 
� ;' Kinship and the State, Social Security and Law in Developing 
Countries (1988) 437-50 at 445-50. 
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changing community circumstances. Congress has reaffirmed the 
critical association between subsistence and the Alaska Native 
way of life, but perhaps unwittingly introduced great potential 
for disruption of that same relationship by encouraging the state 
fox into the rural village hen house. 
Ultimately, the only effective check on excessive state 
regulatory behaviour remains the threat of losing authority over 
federal lands in Alaska--something the state may fear more than 
tribal participation. I f  state regulation is ever perceived as 
being destructive of subsistence ways of life, Congress could act 
again as it did in 1980 to protect subsistence uses. 
VI. Challenges Beyond the Obvious - Future Implementation Issues 
If it is accepted that Congress has required that the state 
discover and incorporate into its system of wildlife management 
the customary laws of Alaska Natives as a condition of its 
managerial authority, new challenges can be anticipated in 
addition to those already revealed by state practice in Alaska 
and elsewhere. I ncorporation of customary law by state legal 
systems is a problem much studied by scholars. 118 Their work 
reveals several common flaws in the process of incorporation. 
I ncorporation through codification removes customary law from its 
interrelationship with other facets of Native life.119 It no 
118 
(1987). 
B. MORSE AND G. WOODMAN , INDIGENOUS LAW AND THE STATE 
1 19 "Even if the imperative norm enforced by the state is 
identical to the customary law, the degree and quality of 
compulsion are certain to differ, so that the effect of this 
measure is not to maintain unchanged the practice under customary 
4 4  
longer interacts with the religious and social systems of tribal 
members and may in fact challenge those systems when the 
authority for its enforcement is placed in non-tribal hands. It 
may not respond to subtle and obvious changes on the same terms 
as it would respond when controlled by indigenous peoples. The 
indigenous system is not merely a system of rules,· but a legal 
process, geared to community needs and adaptable to them. 120 E ven 
sophisticated incorporation of a defined body of rules may result 
in implementation which is not sufficiently grounded in the 
detailed circumstances of community life.121  Sanctions and the 
process for application of sanctions, limits on hunting and 
fishing and permits are foreign instruments of a foreign legal 
law . .  " Bradford w .  Morse and Gorden R.  Woodman, Introductory 
Essay: The State's Options. Id. 1-24, (1987) at 11-12. 
120 On law as process see L. NADER AND H. TODD, JR., THE 
PROCESS-LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES (1978) . 
{V\ o ()-S � {}i r\).J) U)oci t) N\ J),'-'} 
The--a.u.th.G-rs suggest that incorporation by reference is 
preferable to incorporation by replication in the tradition of 
British _G.Qlonial law in order to avoid instances where "codified 
( custom" may beeffec� ways not in accordance with the 
/ DISPUTING 
· 121  
'. ;  )makers' intentions supra note � at 13. Most Native community 
proposals to the state Boards of fish and game have been in the 
direction of effectively nullifying state authority over local 
subsistence uses rather than attempts to get the state 
regulations to reflect any affirmative tribal practice. E . g. ,  
Proposal # 26, Submitted by the Arctic Regional Council, the 
Village of Noatak, and the Village of Noorvik to the Board of 
Game (14 September 1988) which would have exempted local 
residents from state regulations governing subsistence hunting, 
including bag limits, seasons, and methods and means 
restrictions. The proposal would have required the local 
municipality or tribal government to pass an ordinance 
prohibiting the wasteful take of game, providing for enforcement 
of that prohibition, and providing for the collection of data on 
the take of game in the village. 
4 5  
process and not usually familiar tools of traditional and 
customary systems. 122 
If Congress has mandated incorporation of the traditional 
and customary system, that integration of tribal law and state 
law should include a reassessment of the process of state 
wildlife enforcement. Not only the priorities and the rules but 
their mode of definition and application must be rethought. 
Two problems then emerge with incorporation of tribal law 
into state fish and wildlife management, problems which will 
threaten Congressionally-mandated subsistence preference even if 
the state is successful in discovering unwritten norms which 
define appropriate behavior in diverse rural settings. 
The first is that the gap between the cultural definition of 
subsistence practice appropriate to economic, demographic and 
spiritual needs and its integration into customary law edicts and 
procedures will broaden, perhaps, becoming a chasm incapable of 
being bridged by communication between villages and the joint 
board of fish and game who enunciate state regulations. 1� For 
normative regulations to become out of phase with the material 
122 "If . . .  customary procedures are not incorporated but 
customary substantive norms are, the latter, because they are 
incorporated through non-customary procedures, will not perform 
functions closely comparable to those they fulfilled within the 
customary system." Morse and Woodman , supra note 119 at 15. 
123 Bohannan supra note 107 at 49 explains that the 
rearticulation of custom by legal institutions always keeps 
social custom and law somewhat out of phase. The likelihood 
villagers can reduce this gap is entirely dependent on their 
distance from the legal process and their control of it. 
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that 
and spiritual needs of Alaska villagers may mean that village­
derived custom rearticulated as law may be as threatening to the 
survival of subsistence and its natural check against 
overharvesting as would externally derived fish and game 
regulations.1� 
The second problem has already been discovered in 
litigation. 125 Checks on hunting and fishing which are directed 
to individual sports or commercial hunters to prevent their 
overharvesting (�, bag limits and closed seasons) have 
unanticipated and negative results on a hunting and fishing 
culture which is premised on meeting the needs of a defined group 
through the productivity of better hunters and fishermen. 
The state's responsibility to establish a subsistence 
preference against all other uses, subject only to an overriding 
concern for maintaining the viability of wildlife populations 
confronts its own legal culture in fundamental ways. As is 
124 Not only will replicated tribal law become calcified 
and too slowly reflect adaptations in subsistence process, but 
the state legal culture will very likely come to define 
subsistence legal process generically, washing out of 
communications from local councils confusing and subtle details. 
Yet a further temptation for state enforcer of tribal law will be 
to treat "customary and traditional uses" as fixed in time and 
place, failing to provide sufficient flexibility to meet the 
needs of new subsistence generations. See Udall, 126 Cong. Rec. 
H 10545-56 (Nov. 12, 1980). 
125 See NOBLE, supra note 3 at 239, n. 87 on individual bag 
limits and Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to State's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Dismissal in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 19-31 (destructive impact 
of individual bag limit concept and closed season restrictions), 
Bobby v.  Alaska, No. A84-544 (D. Alaska) (1985). 
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obvious in Alaska's bush within the realm of criminal law, the 
highly centralized state legal process does not formally tolerate 
diverse definitions of deviant conduct or diverse or individually 
stylized responses to deviance "in the name of cultural 
awareness. " The impulse of the fish and wildlife enforcement 
system, typical of state legal models, is toward uniformity in 
allocation of privileges and constraints. 1u Those privileges and 
constraints are focused upon individuals and applied evenly. 
Subsistence culture requires unequal allocations of hunting 
and fishing privileges because it is at base a group right and 
not an individual right. How then can Alaska respond to its 
unusual responsibility? 
The authors suggest that the state defer from attempts at 
replication of the detail of subsistence uses as well as further 
application of its own system of permits and seasonal 
restrictions on subsistence harvesters. Where communities are 
prepared to supply the state with reliable statistics on the 
aggregate quantity of wildlife harvested and to confirm the 
residence of individuals who hunt and fish, the state can 
concentrate its energies upon assessment of the continued 
viability of the game populations and focus its attention upon 
For an examination of legal reforms in rural Alaska 
which force legal assimilation upon rural constituents see Conn, 
Alaska Bush Justice: Legal Centralism Confronts Social science 
Q 
Research and Village Alaska, A. Allot and G . R. Woodman eds. , 
0� - People ' s Law and State Law 299 (1985) and Conn, Rural Legal 
Process and Development in the North in T. Lane Ed. Developing 
126 
America's Northern Frontier 199 (1987). 
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non-subsistence users, scaling back their harvesting activities 
in proportion to increased subsistence harvests which impact the 
wildlife population. 1v 
Only when restrictions on subsistence prove necessary to 
sustain the wildlife population, would the state's agents apply 
ANILCA's " second tier" criterion to inquire more closely into 
customary and direct dependence of would-be subsistence 
harvesters, actual residence and availability of alternative 
resources. Even this evaluation would be better accomplished, as 
Congress advocated, by examination of community situations rather 
than individual situations.1� 
This suggested formula for state engagement of its 
responsibility to traditional and customary subsistence 
harvesters allows the state to avoid the improbable task of 
applying tribal law as state law. In fact, it allows the state 
to avoid characterization of the norms and procedures which 
govern subsistence as law. However, whether these are 
characterized as law or as merely community social standards, 
this proposal allows the state to operate as a buffer between 
subsistence use and other wildlife users while still protecting 
127 The state has rejected this approach once already. Supra 
note 9 5. State enforcement of the tribal norm would always be 
available since any violation of local subsistence customs, 
traditions or more formal ordinances would remove the activity from 
the protected priority use category and subject the violater to 
prosecution under the state's second subsistence law. 
128 Subsistence must be evaluated on a community or area 
basis and not on an individual basis. 126 CONG. REC. 29 279 (Nov. 
12, 19 80) (Statement by Rep. Udall) . 
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the game and fish populations. By giving villages the 
-- _,• 
responsibility for monitoring subsistence take without detailed 
inquiry into actual practice, it provides an important incentive 
for villages to take steps necessary to invigorate their systems 
to curb waste and to report sport or commercial hunting for state 
scrutiny and enforcement. Invigoration through law reform may 
occur on customary or on Western terms, as the community 
chooses.129 What is important is that the definition and destiny 
of the subsistence option will not be usurped by its state 
protectors or merely "co-managed, " but left firmly in rural 
community hands. As has occurred in informal relationships 
between state law and village law, the state system will 
reinforce the latter and, perhaps, spur its reform as 
demographics and technological pressures force subsistence 
managers to adapt to new needs and trends. An incentive will 
exist to separate out sports and commercial hunters and fishermen 
for state monitoring and enforcement, be they Native or non­
Native. 
This formula for addressing the state's obligation serves 
the present and future needs of the state, of the villages which 
focus their attention on adaptations of their subsistence 
processes and the continued viability of the game populations. 
129 It  is this instrumental capacity by villages to create 
its own determined blend of custom, village law and formal legal 
intervention that marks adaptive legal pluralism in this and in 
many other legal contexts when powerful state systems engage less 
powerful communities marked by a different legal culture. Conn, 
Rural Legal Process, supra note 126 at 199-203 . 
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The interests of each are enhanced. Villages which maintain 
control through adjustments will also avoid nonrational political 
pressure and unwarranted intervention, both sources of present 
tensions.130 Operative premises of the legal cultures of village 
Alaska and Alaska the state are accepted. 131 
The approach advocated is not a new one. It �as revealed 
from the earliest relationships between nation states and Indian 
tribes on the American continent . Each sovereign domain 
undertakes tasks appropriate to itself and its members on the 
land that it now shares. Each sovereign will fulfill what it has 
articulated as its historical destiny, on lands and waters 
neither entirely owns - the state of Alaska acting as protector 
of resources on public lands and village Alaska as protector of 
the relationship between its resident-members and wildlife on the 
land and waters . 
130 See Noble supra note 3 at 241 where in footnote 98 she 
describes reactions of rural hunters who stop all hunting "rather 
than risk inadvertently violating some regulation of which they 
are ignorant. " 
131 The assumption that an efficient indigenous system 
which provides controls upon hunting and generates reliable 
reports of community kills assumes a comparable rationality on 
the part of the state managers on two points: first, Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game will muster the political will to 
restrict and even eliminate sport and commercial harvests when 
necessary to maintain a subsistence preference; second, that the 
Joint Board (and the courts) will not confuse application of 
legal definition of customary and traditional use with an 
unwarranted and artificial restriction upon aggregate harvests or 
the means employed to harvest wildlife thus sabotaging the very 
processes of village game management that have survived through 
adaptation by transforming subsistence into a component of a 
living museum. 
51 
The ultimate question for Congress and the federal courts is 
whether the state of Alaska is capable of coexisting with a 
diversity of indigenous wildlife regimes for eligible rural 
Native and non-Native residents. Will it "allocate'' sufficient 
authority back to indigenous communities to allow indigenous 
wildlife management as a legal process to provide appropriate 
guidance to subsistence activities? If it cannot Congress may 
need to explicitly restructure the relationship between Alaska 
Native villages and state fish and game management by 
transforming a process of upward communication and downward 
enforcement into a process of co-existent and concurrent 
management. Protection of the adaptive subsistence way of life 
will not otherwise occur. 
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